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People confront problems and choose means to 
address those problems as part of their everyday lives. 
Often, the way in which these problems are resolved 
reflects the power of the parties involved in the dispute 
("disputants"). Research on dispute resolution has 
demonstrated that unequal distribution of power is, in 
fact, a key factor in detennining how disputes are 
resolved. Power imbalances can range from structural 
inequities between employer and employees (Edelman, 
Erlanger, and Lande 1993), to societal effects of gender 
interactions (Grillo 1991), to unequal levels of access 
to information and strategic positioning (Galanter 
1974). While dispute resolution has been studied in 
numerous situations, few studies have investigated how 
disputes are resolved within organizations that attempt 
to minimize power imbalances by flattening their 
structures and evenly distributing their ownership. I 
accomplished this by comparing dispute resolution 
strategies at conventional organizations and shared-
power organizations (i.e., worker cooperatives). 
Worker cooperatives are businesses that are managed 
and owned by their workers, and they exist to provide 
employment to their member-employees. Because they 
offer instructive insights into the relationship between 
power and dispute resolution, worker cooperatives are 
the primary focus of my research. 
Extant research suggests that organizational 
structure, ownership, and ideology greatly affect how 
employees address their problems at work (i.e., their 
grievance behavior). Because this project draws on 
various bodies of literature, it addresses several 
predictions on dispute resolution in worker 
cooperatives. Sociology of Gender literature 
emphasizes that successful dispute resolution is not 
guaranteed, especially for women and other less-
powerful groups, and that organizational innovations 
that benefit some workers, such as an emphasis on the 
organization as a whole over a focus on individuals, 
might disproportionately hann women (e.g., Gwartney-
Gibbs and Lach 1994). The Organizations literature 
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cautions that worker cooperatives might not be a viable 
alternative to the conventional, hierarchical business. 
Moreover, these worker cooperatives may be less 
efficient and less likely to succeed as organizations. If 
these businesses do struggle into existence and succeed, 
however, their workers might enjoy such benefits as 
greater respect and recognition and less labor-
management conflict (e.g., Hochner, Granrose, Goode, 
Simon, and Appelbaum 1988). The Dispute Resolution 
literature asserts that greater trust and shared goals 
facilitate easier and more successful dispute resolution; 
one might imagine that increased trust and shared goals 
will be more common in worker cooperatives, where 
inclusion, equality, and worker participation are 
officially encouraged (e.g., Tjosvold, Morishima, and 
Belsheim 1999). The literature on worker cooperatives 
suggests that evenly distributed fonnal power and 
greater worker participation should produce workers-
including women and other dis empowered groups-
who are able to assert their needs and raise necessary 
grievances, but cautions that the continued presence of 
infonnal power might prevent some grievances from 
being voiced at all. 
Thus, cooperative businesses present a stark contrast 
to conventionally organized businesses in that the 
cooperatives attempt to evenly distribute power, 
encourage worker control through egalitarian 
ideologies and flattened management structure, and 
engage in concerted efforts to minimize power 
imbalances. 1 Unlike the producer cooperatives that are 
scattered across the fannlands of the Midwest, in 
worker cooperatives, "all the facilities, materials, 
supplies, equipment, etc., are equally owned 
collectively by the members. The goods and services 
are seen as being provided by the co-op, not by 
individual members" (Honigsberg, Kamoroff, and 
Beatty 1982, p. 32). 
I focused on worker cooperatives, rather than 
producer, housing, or consumer cooperatives,2 because 
this type of cooperative business offers the most 
interesting glimpse into the relationship between 
dispute resolution and power dynamics. Grievance 
resolution and the power around it are most complex at 
worker cooperatives because workplaces generally 
have greater power inequalities than agricultural, 
housing, and consumer organizations. More so than 
where one lives or where one shops, workplaces 
operate within a hierarchy of power. Additionally, 
workplaces, as the most complicated type of 
organization in which to experiment with evenly 
dispersed power, are an abundant source of sociolegal 
issues. Workplaces involve issues of rights, 
interdependencies, and internal and external pressures 
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which provide opportunities for particularly rich 
research on workplace dispute resolution. 
Furthermore, the organizational power imbalances 
readily accepted at workplaces are not as entrenched 
and pervasive in other institutions, which, instead, often 
actively work to mitigate power imbalances. For 
example, non-cooperative (conventional) stores try to 
be responsive to customer needs and solicit consumer 
input. Similarly, non-cooperative housing might try to 
give residents a voice in the management of their 
building. Such involvement of consumers and 
residents is not considered radical or even unusual; 
indeed, such efforts for inclusion are considered good 
business practices and are incorporated by very 
mainstream, conventional businesses. 
Workplaces operate under the belief that the best 
organization is hierarchical and with great deference to 
power differences, however, even to the point of 
emphasizing power inequalities. Through differences 
in titles, responsibilities, privileges, and pay, 
employees are allocated different statuses with varying 
amounts of power. Some argue that hierarchical 
differences in status are at the core of many businesses' 
organization. Thus, the differences between consumer 
cooperatives and conventional stores, and housing 
cooperatives and other group living situations, are 
minimal compared to the potentially vast differences 
between worker cooperatives and conventional 
businesses. 
A few researchers have begun to explore grievance 
resolution in worker cooperative businesses (e.g., 
Henry 1983; Tucker 1999). While some of these 
researchers assume that such organizations exhibit 
unique grievance behavior, one cannot infer that 
flattened hierarchies and professed egalitarian 
ideologies eliminate the impact of power on disputing, 
mainly due to the distribution of power within them. 
As Kleinman argues, power in these cooperatives 
includes official components as well as unofficial 
power (1996). Therefore, research in this area must 
examine grievances with dual foci on official as well as 
unofficial power. Official power refers to power 
derived from explicitly stated rights or entitlements, 
such as the right to formal grievance procedures or 
democratic participation as outlined in an 
organization's charter or an employment contract. 
Unofficial power is power derived from more informal 
sources, such as sex, race, or tenure in an organization, 
and is often not explicitly acknowledged. The official 
power distribution in a cooperative organization may 
be more equalized, but the unofficial power mayor 
may not be equally dispersed. Unofficial power might 
not only contravene the official rules and ideology, but 
may, in fact, contradict the explicit goals of the 
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organization. Some researchers (e.g., Kanter 1982) 
assert that unofficial power might be more critical in 
cooperative contexts than in conventional workplaces. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Using a qualitative comparative case method, I 
investigated the relationship between formal and 
informal grievance processing and official and 
unofficial power. I defined formal grievances as any 
disputes resolved through explicit procedures, 
specifically designated by the organization for the 
resolution of disputes. These grievances can be 
between workers, between workers and management, 
or between workers and the organization itself. 
Informal grievances are similar types of disputes, but 
are resolved through negotiation or informal mediation 
without invoking any formalized dispute resolution 
procedures. I compared interviews with 177 workers 
from eight worksites in four industries-coal mining, 
taxicab driving, wholefoods distribution, and 
homecare. In each industry, I studied a matched set of 
one worker cooperative and one conventional business. 
These matched organizations are similar in size, 
industry gender proportions, gender and race 
proportions within the businesses, and gender of 
managers. Within each matched set, I compared and 
contrasted the grievance behavior of the worker 
cooperative and that of the conventionally managed, 
hierarchical business. 
Additionally, this dissertation focused on two types 
of power: official power and unofficial power. Official 
power is explicit and is formally part of the 
organization's rules. It is derived from explicitly stated 
rights or entitlements and is often formally wlitten 
down. Official power is a characteristic of an 
organization or an industry; therefore, for a given 
categOlY of workers within a business---Dr all workers 
in smaller businesses such as those studied in this 
project--official power will be unifOlm. In some 
businesses, this official power was unifoffilly low; at 
others it was unifonnly high. Interviewees' official 
power was consistently equal with the co-workers' 
within their organization because I focused on ranlc-
and-file workers' grievance strategies, as opposed to 
including owners' responses. I examined official 
power by comparing the explicitly stated rights and 
entitlements within the worker cooperatives and 
conventionally organized businesses, inquiring to 
ensure that the explicitly stated official power was, in 
fact, realized. For example, any members could be 
elected to worker-management positions, so I asked if 
there were any bars to being elected, such as certain 
jobs' hours being viewed as incompatible with 
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management meetings. I did not find any 
inconsistencies with regard to official power. 
I identified unofficial power through interviewees' 
reports of power derived from informal sources. I 
defined unofficial power as power that does not come 
from an organization's rules, but from workers' 
statuses outside and inside the organization. Unofficial 
power is not part of the organizational structure ~n that 
it exists independently of personnel. Workers wIth 
unofficial power had greater access to organizational 
information, held more institutional knowledge, 
maintained strong informal networks, and enjoyed 
greater access to worker-managers or board members. 
Through unofficial power, workers could mobilize 
organizational responses to their disputes through 
informal means. 
Unofficial power has both individual and 
organizational components. While I am interested in 
the culture of power and disputing at the organizational 
level I measured this at the individual level because disp~tes-my focus-are individual phenomena. 
However, the organizational level of analysis is not 
simply an aggregate of the power of the individual 
workers, but is part of the organizational structure and 
culture. Since individuals' amounts of power were 
affected by the organization's structure and culture, the 
individuals' dispute resolution styles came out of that 
organizational culture. Thus, I examined power at both 
the individual level and the organizational level, 
specifically, individual-level power endowments and 
organizational power structures. In this way, the actual 
dispute strategies, the focus of this project, were caused 
by individual-level power, but this relationship cannot 
be understood without also studying the organizational 
structure. 
Power is often conceptualized as a relational 
attribute, rather than as a characteristic of organizations 
or individuals. Emerson (1962), for example, views 
power as relational, in that he understood power "not as 
a characteristic of individuals but rather as a property of 
a social relation" (Scott 1992, p. 302). He asserts that 
power can only be understood in the context of a 
relation with another; power is meaningless unless it is 
power over another, e.g., A's power over B makes B do 
what B otherwise would not. While I agree with this 
understanding of power, in this particular study, the 
relational aspect of power is less important. This is so 
because the relations examined in this project are the 
same: I focused on only the relation of workers trying 
to mobilize the behavior of the organization to address 
their disputes. In other words, power is relational, but I 
studied only one relation. Thus, while amounts of 
unofficial power varied across individuals and 
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organizations, I focused on only one type of 
relationship within which power occasionally varied. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The ideological and practical struggles around the 
issue of power have made cooperatives ideal sites for 
this research. The worker cooperatives in this study 
achieved various levels of equality in the day-to-day 
workings of their businesses. Some allowed certain 
formal hierarchies of official power since their creation, 
such as the management stluctures that are mandatory 
in the coal industly; others succumbed over time to 
allow certain groups to retain greater unofficial power, 
such as the subsets of workers at wholefoods 
cooperatives who had more unofficial power than their 
co-workers. This dissertation does not specifically 
address the degree of success or failure that each 
worker cooperative achieved, nor does it critique the 
level of equality initially intended or eventually 
achieved by each cooperative. Rather, I explored how 
official and unofficial power affect dispute resolution 
strategies with specific focus on gender differences in 
grievance behavior. I made comparisons between 
cooperatives and conventional businesses and among 
industries with various gender compositions to draw 
out the intricate relationships between power, structure, 
culture, and grievance resolution. 
I show that the effect of unofficial power on 
grievance resolution may be more substantial than that 
of official power, creating unintended workplace 
cultures not immediately evident from organizations' 
formal regulations and rules. This is true both for 
worker cooperatives, where the professed goal was 
equality, as well as for conventional businesses with 
hierarchies of unequal amounts of workplace power. I 
analyzed cooperatives that had deliberately structured 
themselves to equalize official power, yet had subsets 
of their workforce with far more unofficial power than 
other co-workers. For example, all members of the 
taxicab worker cooperative were officially equal, but 
men at the cooperative possessed greater unofficial 
power than women. 
This does not mean that unofficial and official 
power were always in conflict. I also examined 
cooperatives with officially egalitarian ideologies and 
flattened structures intended to evenly distribute power, 
where members did, in fact, have a high level of 
equality, sharing official and unofficial power. For 
example, members of the cooperative coal mine had 
high levels of both official and unofficial power; they 
had extensive official rights and they exercised 
unofficial power regularly. Similarly, I included 
hierarchical businesses that made no attempt to create 
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equal, shared power, and whose employees, indeed, 
had little official or unofficial power, such as the 
conventionally-organized wholefoods distribution 
company. 
The first portion of my research demonstrates how 
official power and unofficial power affect grievance 
behavior. Here, I argue that workers with official 
power but little unofficial power were more likely to 
use formal grievance procedures to resolve disputes 
because they did not have the option of informal 
grievance resolution. However, workers with high 
levels of both official and unofficial power could 
choose from infOlmal or formal routes, but preferred 
informal grievance resolution. Workers with little 
power--either official or unofficial-often opted to 
leave their jobs or learned to tolerate potential 
grievances, rather than address workplace disputes 
formally or informally. 
The second part of my research, however, 
complicates this straightforward model. There, I 
explore workers at organizations with different power 
structures, but similar grievance behaviors. These were 
the workers in the homecare businesses. At each 
homecare business, the home care workers had a 
different amount of power from workers at the other 
home care sites, yet all preferred to resolve disputes 
informally. I explain this by examining the structure 
and culture of the homecare industry. Unlike the 
workers in the other three industries-where disputes 
generally involved two parties: the worker and the 
manager (or another worker)-disputes in homecare 
industries involved at least three parties: the worker, 
the manager (or another worker), and the client. This 
greatly changed the dynamics of grievance resolution, 
increasing the difficulty of raising formal grievances. 
In fact, very few workers in any of the three homecare 
businesses discussed formal grievance strategies. 
Therefore, I argue that this triangular nature of disputes 
in the homecare industry (i.e., worker-manager-client), 
as well as the industry's ethic of care, override the 
previously illustrated influence of power on grievance 
resolution. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
Many earlier studies by other researchers inform this 
thesis, as I mentioned previously. These are discussed 
in Chapter 2, in which I draw from the literatures of 
Sociology of Law, of Gender, and of Complex 
Organizations, as well as the limited research on 
worker cooperatives. These literatures predict 
substantial differences in grievance strategies between 
workers in cooperatives and conventional businesses, 
and between male and female workers. 
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I describe the businesses and industries that I 
included in this study in Chapter 3. The industries are 
arrayed along a gender continuum from businesses that 
employ mostly men in a traditionally male occupation 
(i.e., coal mining) to businesses that employ mostly 
women in a traditionally female occupation (i.e., 
homecare). I also included taxicab companies, which 
represent an indusuy that remains predominantly male, 
and wholefoods distribution, which is "gender neutral," 
employing even proportions of men and women. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss research methods and some 
of the methodological issues involved. The data were 
gathered primarily through open-ended interviews and 
some nonparticipant observations. The interviews were 
analyzed using NVivo qualitative data software, which 
allowed me to easily tally responses by interviewees to 
illustrate the patterns in their responses. 
Chapters 5 and 6 describe and discuss my results. In 
contrast to the divisions predicted by the literature, I 
did not find the structure and ideology of the 
organizations to affect grievance behavior unifonnly 
throughout the four industries. While consistent 
differences existed between cooperatives and 
conventional businesses within the various industries, 
these did not establish a pattern across all businesses. 
Gender divisions, also, were not found in the grievance 
behavior throughout the industries. Instead, I found 
that varying degrees of official and unofficial power 
affected workers' use of formal and informal grievance 
resolution within each indUStry. 
In the final chapter, Chapter 7, I provide a summary, 
a brief discussion of policy implications, and 
suggestions for future research. 
Worker cooperatives offer a unique window into the 
dynamics of power and dispute resolution. Their 
flattened hierarchies, egalitarian ideology, and shared 
ownership redistribute power in both predictable and 
surprising ways. These unique organizational 
characteristics provide interesting sociolegal insights 
into worker power and grievance behavior, and allow a 
qualitative inquiry into how the structure and culture of 
industries and workplaces affect workers' dispute 
resolution strategies. 
NOTES 
1. Worker cooperatives still have many of the goals of 
conventional businesses, such as profits and efficiency. 
2. In housing cooperatives, the cooperative (the organization 
itself, usually) owns the building and rents the housing to 
members (Honigsberg, P.I., B. Kamoroff et al. 1982). 
Many housing cooperatives, in addition to payment of 
rent, also require services from members, such as 
housekeeping, cooking, or yardwork. Consumer 
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cooperatives are owned by the consumers who shop at 
them, not by their employees. Sometimes called "member 
discount co-ops," consumer cooperatives provide goods at 
reduced prices to those who have purchased a membership 
(Honigsberg, P.I., B. Kamoroff et al. 1982). 
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